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CASE NOTES

A New Measure of Damages for Tippee-Trading
Violations Under Rule lob-5: Elkind v. Liggett &
Myers, Inc.
Of all the issues arising under section 10(b) and rule lob-5
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: the subject of damages
is the least formulated.' The extent of liability in private actions
has been particularly unsettled in the case of "tippee" tradings
on an impersonal market. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
established a private right of action for
Fenner & Smith,
all uninformed outsiders who trade during a period of tippee
trading but left the measure of damages open to speculation. Because of the expansive size of this plaintiff class, concern arose
over the potentially colossal liability under traditional measures
of damages. In Elkind u. Liggett & Myers, Inc.' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confronted the
issue and adopted a new measure of damages that places a ceiling on the otherwise potentially ruinous liability. Unlike the
traditional "out-of-pocket" measure applied by the district
court: the new "disgorgement" measure limits recovery to the
amount the tippee gained from his wrongful trading?
1. 15 U.S.C.

$8 78a-78hh (1976).

2. Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule lob-5 Cases, 65 GEO.L.J. 1093, 1095
(1977).
3. Tipping has been defined as "the selective disclosure of material inside information." 5A A. JACOBS,
THEIMPACT
OF RULElob-5 8 162 (rev. ed. 1980). Damages are not
recoverable for tipping alone. The gravamen of the violation is the tippee's trading on
the basis of the tipped information while it is yet nonpublic. For this both the tipper and
tippee are liable. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (1980). Elkind appears to be the first case to actually impose damages in a private action for tippee
trading.
4. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
5. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
6. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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I. INSTANT
CASE
1971 marked a record year for Liggett & Myers, 1nc.P with
earnings of $4.22 per share. The first quarter of 1972 was equally
promising with earnings of $1.00 per share (compared to $31 in
the first quarter of 1971).@Release of these figures caused optimism in the financial community over Liggett's prospects and
led to reports predicting that 1972 earnings would increase by
about ten percent over 1971 earnings. In contrast to outward appearances and unknown to the public, second quarter earnings
dropped sharply. In late June, the price of Liggett's common
stock began to steadily decline. On July 17, 1972, the board of
directors received preliminary data showing the first half earnings at only $1.46 per share, down from $1.82 the previous
year.1° On the same day, one day before the earnings information was released to the public, a securities analyst questioned
the company's chief financial officer about the recent decline in
price of Liggett's common stock. When he asked whether there
was "a good possibility" that earnings would be down, he received an aflirmative "grudging" response. The Liggett officer
added that this information was confidential.ll The analyst then
sent a wire to his firmla and spoke with a stockbroker from a
different firml%ho promptly sold 1,800 shares of Liggett stock
on behalf of his customers.14
A class action was brought against Liggett & Myers, Inc. by
Arnold B. Elkind on behalf of all purchasers of Liggett & Myers
stock between the time of the wrongful tip and the subsequent
8. Liggett is a diversified company whose common stock is listed on the New York
Stock Exchange. Id. at 158-59.
9. Id. at 159.
10. Id. at 160.
11. Id. at 161.
12. Interestingly, although the wire stated that because of low second-quarter earnings the first-half earnings would likely be lower than the previous year's, it did not
recommend selling Liggett shares and in fact expressed optimism that the year as a
whole should still show "some improvement" over the previous year's earnings, though
not as much as previously forecast. Id. at n.7.
13. The opinion of the Second Circuit omits the fact that the stockbroker was from
a different firm than that of the financial analyst. See 472 F. Supp. at 128. This distinction is critical in order to understand the not new but important principle that the liability of a tipper of inside information extends beyond trading by the tippee to trading by
tippees of the tippee (sometimes called "remote" or "indirect" tippees). 5A A. JACOBS,
supra note 3, Q 167.
14. The liability of Liggett & Myers is predicated upon the trading of the stockbroker. See note 3 supra.
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public dis~losure.~~
The district court found, and the Second
Circuit firmed, that the July 17 divulgence constituted a tip of
material l6 inside information, made with scienter, in violation of
rule lob-5.'' Both courts agreed that all purchasers of Liggett
stock between the afternoon of July 17 and the close of the market on July 18 l8 were entitled to damages. The courts, however,
differed on how damages were to be measured.
The district court looked to the out-of-pocket measure of
damages and awarded the plaintiffs the difference between what
they had paid for their stock and the "actual value" received-that is, the price at which the stock would have theoretically sold had the tip been publicly disclosed prior to the time
of purchase.le To determine the "actual value" the court looked
to the post-disclosure market price:20
[Tlhe price which plaintiffs would have paid for their stock in
the period [between the tip and public disclosure of the tipped
information] . . . can be inferred from the price which investors did pay for Liggett stock after they had absorbed the news
contained in the Liggett press release of July
15. The plaintiff class was originally much larger. However, claims based on earlier
alleged violations were dismissed by the district court and their dismissal affirmed by the
circuit court. The district court determined that a tip of material inside information had
occurred on July 10 and granted recovery to all plaintifh who purchased Liggett stock
between July 11and July 18,1972. The class was trimmed further by the Second Circuit,
which reversed the finding of liability based on the alleged July 10 tip and found the
only violation to be the July 17 divulgence.
16. Even though the tip did not prompt the securities analyst to advise his own firm
to sell Liggett stock on behalf of its customers, the tip was found to be material. The
Second Circuit correctly considered the tip's materiality, not in light of the tippee's subjective judgment of its relevance, but rather in light of the objective standard of
"whether the tipped information, if divulged to the public, would have been likely to
affect the decision of potential buyers and sellers." 635 F.2d at 166.
17. Id. at 168.
18. Although a press release was issued at 2:15 p.m. on July 18, the court extended
the period of liability to the end of the trading day, reasoning that public disclosure was
not made until the information appeared in the Wall Street Journul early the next
morning. Id. at 173.
19. 472 F. Supp. at 130-35.
20. Originally the court used a "value line" to determine the hypothetical decline in
value that would have occurred had the tipped information been released at the time of
the tippee trading. Id. at 129-30. Later the court filed an "Opinion Amending Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law" in which it concluded that the value line was based on the
premise that Liggett had first breached its duty in June 1972, an allegation later proved
false. Without sufficient evidence to construct a value line for the shorter period of liability ultimately found, the court determined "actual value" by looking to the post-disclosure market price. Id. at 132-35.
21. Id. at 132.
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Finding that it took eight trading days for the market to fully
absorb the information contained in the press release, the court
awarded damages based on the price of $43, the lowest closing
price for Liggett stock during the eight trading days following
the press release of July 18." Thus, the plaintiffs were awarded
the difference between the price they paid for Liggett stock and
$43, the "actual value" found by the district court. Based on the
volume of trading during the period of liability, this would have
amounted to a judgment of approximately $190,000.2s
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of
liability for the July 17 tip but remanded the case for a redetermination of damages. In considering the question of damages,
the court recognized three possible measures. First, the court examined the traditional out-of-pocket measure used by the district court. For several reasons, the court felt this measure was
inappropriate. To begin with, the out-of-pocket measure is
aimed at compensating victims of fraud for losses directly attributable to the defendant. On an impersonal market, no such
fraud can be attributed to a tipper or tippee." In addition, the
court reasoned, the measure often involves insurmountable proof
problems in tippee-trading cases. Because the "actual value" of
the stock traded during the period of liability is hypothetical,
expert testimony aimed at establishing that value may be highly
speculative." Use of the post-disclosure market price as alternative evidence of "actual value" during the period of nondisclosure is likewise fallible. The validity of this approach depends on
the parity of the tip and the public disclosure. When the two
differ, the basis of the damage calculation disappears. For example, public disclosure of the July 17 tip that there was "a good
possibility" that earnings would be down would not necessarily
have caused as great alarm as did the next day's press release of
the disappointing preliminary earnings figures? Perhaps the
most compelling reason, in the court's view, for rejecting the
22. Id. at 133.
23. The actual award was $740,000, based on the longer period of liability beginning
with the July 10 tip. Id. at 135-36. The $190,000 figure is a calculation made by the
author based on the estimated volume of trading during the shorter period of liability
found by the Second Circuit. See id. at 136 app.
24. 635 F.2d at 170.
25. Id.
26. The court illustrates the parity problem by pointing out the difliculty of calculating how the public would have reacted to news that the Titanic was near an iceberg
from how it later reacted to news that the oceanliner had struck an iceberg and sunk. Id.
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out-of-pocket measure is its potential for imposing "DraconiadPP7damages that are totally out of proportion to the wrong
committed. Because the liability in tippee-trading cases often
falls ultimately on the innocent shareholders of the defendant
c~rporation,'~
the court expressed reluctance to impose full outof-pocket damages in cases of moderate or light tippee trading
not likely to have substantially affected the market price of the
stock.
Next, the Second Circuit examined the direct market-repercussion theory of damages. This measure would allow an innocent investor who bought Liggett & Myers shares at or after the
time the tippee sold Liggett shares on the basis of inside information to recover any decline in value of his shares that is traceable to the tippee's wrongful trading." In the court's view, the
advantage of this measure-limitation of the plaintiffs recovery
to the amount of damage actually caused by the defendantiis
outweighed by the extremely difficult and sometimes impossible
burden of proving the extent to which a market price movement
.~
the meais attributable to the tippee's c o n d u ~ tFurthermore,
sure allows no recovery for the tippee's violation of his duty to
either disclose material inside information or to abstain from
trading."
Finally, the court weighed the pros and cons of the disgorgement measure of damages. This measure was described as
follows:
A third alternative is (1)to allow any uninformed investor

. . . to recover any post-purchase decline in market value of

his shares up to a reasonable time after he learns of the tipped
informationsPor after there is a public disclosure of it but (2)
limit his recovery to the amount gained by the tippee. . . .as
27. This esoteric adjective derives from the Athenian lawgiver Draco, whose code of
laws was exceedingly severe. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY
443 (5th ed. 1979).
28. The claims against all individual defendants, such as the corporate officer responsible for the illegal tip, were dropped; the only party defendant brought to trial was
the corporation. 472 F. Supp. at 124.
29. 635 F.2d at 171.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. For reasons stated in notes 62 through 64 and the accompanying text infra, the
author questions the propriety of denying the uninformed investor recovery for the decline in value of his shares after he learns of the tipped information but before the information is made public.
33. 635 F.2d at 172 (footnote added).
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To illustrate, the court posed a hypothetical situation in which a
tippee sells 5,000 shares of stock in X Corporation at $50 per
share on the basis of inside information; before public disclosure
an uninformed investor buys securities in X Corporation at $45
per share; and within a reasonable time after public disclosure
the stock declines to $40 per share. Under the disgorgement
measure, the uninformed purchaser would recover the difference
between his purchase price ($45) and the market price within a
reasonable time after public disclosure ($40), subject to a limit
of $50,000, the amount the tippee gained by trading on inside
information rather than on an equal information basis. If the
aggregate claims of the intervening buyers exceed the tippee's
gain, "their recovery (limited to that gain) would be shared pro
rata."s4
In assessing the disgorgement measure, the court pointed
out several advantages. Most importantly, the measure avoids
the imposition of excessive, "Draconian" damages and, in most
cases, results in damages awards roughly commensurate to the
actual harm caused by tippee trading. Because the calculations
required are simple and precise, the disgorgement measure
avoids the troublesome proof problems involved in other measures. In addition, the court felt the measure would deter tipping of inside information and tippee trading?
The court also considered the disadvantages of the measure.
For one, it modifies the principle that, ordinarily, liability for a
rule lob-5 violation should not depend upon gain to the wrongdoer. The measure also partially duplicates disgorgement remedies available to the SEC. In addition, the court recognized that
in certain situations the measure might seem to favor the wrongdoer, as where the total claims exceed the tippee's gain and pro
rata recovery is mandated, or where, because of the modest
amount of tippee trading, a class action may not be worthwhile.
In contrast, the tipper and tippee may be vulnerable to heavy
damages when the market price is depressed by causes unrelated
to the tippee's trading. Despite these disadvantages, "as between
the various alternatives [the court was] persuaded, after weighing the pros and cons, that the disgorgement measure . . offers
the most equitable resolution of the difficult problems created

.

34. Id.
35. Id..
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by conflicting interests.""

11. ANALYSIS
A. Policy Considerations
The Second Circuit's decision is consistent with the remedial purpose of rule lob-5 and is sound in terms of law and policy. The process by which the court adopted the new damages
measure-weighing the pros and cons of the various alternatives
in light of policy concerns-is consistent with Supreme Court
guidelines. Commenting on the lack of legislative direction in
the development of rule lob-5, the Court has noted that "[ilt is
therefore proper that we consider, in addition to [other] factors
. . , what may be described as policy considerations when we
come to flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which
neither the congressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive g~idance."'~Because the body of law on
private actions under rule lob-5 is largely "a judicial oak which
has grown from little more than a legislative acorn,"" the Supreme Court has given federal courts a broad mandate, in the
context of implied civil causes of action, to fashion whatever
remedies may be appropriate to effect the general remedial purpose intended by Congres~.~@
Given this broad mandate, analysis
of any damages measure for tippee trading violations necessarily
centers on the policies that underlie rule lob-5.
Rule lob-5 "is based in policy on the justifiable expectation
of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information."'O To achieve equality of information in the market, damages measures have traditionally focused on deterring conduct
inconsistent with that aim and compensating victims of violations." As the scope of rule lob-5 has expanded from face-toface transactions to impersonal market transactions, some commentators have suggested that in the open or public market context a broad deterrent policy should predominate over the com-

.

36. Id. at 173.
37. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
38. Id.
39. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); J. I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
40. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
SECURITIES
AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE
LAW$ 9.22[1] (rev.
41. 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL,
ed. 1979).
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pensatory policy relevant in the private market.'2 Another
recent concern of courts and commentators has been to avoid
awarding colossal damages to indeterminate classes of plaintiffs
to be paid in the last instance by innocent shareholder^.^^ The
problem with arriving at a measure of damages consistent with
the above policy considerations is that not all of the policy considerations are harmonious. For example, the deterrent element
of a damages measure must sometimes be compromised in order
to avoid the imposition of excessive damages. The most appropriate damages formula, then, will be the one that best balances
the varying policy considerations-in other words, the one which
provides an adequate amount of deterrence and justly compensates victims but which avoids the imposition of exorbitant damages ultimately payable by innocent shareholders.

B. Damages Measures Rejected by the Elkind Court
1. The out-of-pocket measure

The Second Circuit wisely rejected the out-of-pocket measure. The out-of-pocket measure awards to all members of the
plaintiff class the difference between the amount they paid for
their stock and the "actual value" received, i.e., the price a t
which the stock would have sold had there been public disclosure of the tipped information. Although this measure fully compensates the victims and more than adequately deters violators,
it often does so at the expense of innocent shareholders and can
lead to astronomical awards out of all proportion to the wrong
42. Note, Rule lob-5 Damages: The Runaway Development of a Common Law
Remedy, 28 U . h a . L. REV.76, 100-101 (1975). One commentator maintains that deterrence should be the only goal of remedies for open market violations and that compensatory remedies are inappropriate. Thus, he suggests that private actions be abolished because SEC investigations and criminal sanctions provide adequate deterrence. Note,
Limiting the Plaintiff Class: Rule lob-5 and the Federal Securities Code, 72 ~ C H L.
.
REV.1398, 1429-30 (1974). But see Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 314 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977) (primary purpose of the private cause of action
is to compensate plaintiffs for damages caused by defendants' illegal acts).
43. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866-67 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly,
J., concurring); 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL,
supra note 41, 5 9.22[1]. See also Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,739 (1975). Elkind is an illustration of the
corporation being held liable as a tipper of inside information on an agency theory, the
tip of the corporate officer is imputed to the corporation. Because the liability of tipper
and tippee for the tippee's wrongful trading is the same, the corporation's deep pocket
makes it the most logical defendant from the plaintiff's standpoint. A damages award
paid by the corporation is indirectly borne by the shareholders.
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committed. In some cases the victims may be overcompensated,
as where the market price of their shares is depressed by factors
totally unrelated to the tippee trading or to the public disclosure
of the tipped information. Where the post-disclosure market
price is used to determine "actual value" during the period of
nondisclosure, the wrongdoers become virtual insurers for losses
sustained by anyone who happens to trade in the same stock
until public disclosure is made.44
In addition to these policy reasons against the out-of-pocket
measure, there are legal grounds against its application to impersonal market violations. Because the out-of-pocket measure
may potentially provide for damages in excess of those caused in
fact by the defendant," it may contravene the mandate of section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that "no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages
shall recover
. . . a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account
of the act complained of."46 The weak causal link between tippee trading on an impersonal market and the harm to intervening traders justifies a damages measure less stringent than the
out-of-pocket measure. In light of the courts' tendency to relax
the common law elements of fraud initially thought to be a prerequisite to liability for a rule lob-5 violation, recovery need not
depend on a strict finding of causation. This does not mean,
however, that the question of causation should be ignored and
full recovery allowed when the plaintiffs harm cannot logically
be attributed to the defendant's wrongful act.

...

2. The direct market-repercussion theory

The direct market-repercussion theory of damages is a futile
answer to the difficult question of causation. In theory, this measure avoids unwarranted damages awards by allowing recovery
only for injuries caused by the tippee trading. However, the direct market-repercussion measure is practical only in cases of
heavy tippee trading, where an actual market impact can be
proven. In cases of light or moderate tippee trading, where the
44. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053
(1977), illustrates this problem. The profit of one of the defendants, which had already
been disgorged in an SEC proceeding, amounted to only $13,000. A finding of liability in
a private class action under the out-of-pocket measure might have produced a damages
award in excess of $7 million. Id. at 321 n.29.
45. See notes 52 through 59 and accompanying text infra.
46. 15 U.S.C. $ 78bb(a) (1976).
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impact on the market is likely to be negligible, the wrongdoers
are protected by the difficult standard of proof. Thus, modest
tippee trading would flourish. The expense of proving the extent
to which a market price decline is traceable to the defendant's
conduct would likely involve expert witness fees and higher attorneys fees than those in the other, more mechanical measures
of damages. These increased costs would discourage private litigation where the possible award is not high enough to make a
suit worthwhile. The direct market-repercussion theory fails to
serve two important policy aims of rule lob-5: it inadequately
deters rule violations and undercompensates victims of such
violations.
3. Other measures

Other measures of damages not considered by the Second
Circuit47are generally subject to the same criticisms as the outof-pocket measure, especially in their potential for imposing
"Draconian" liability. Motivated by a distaste for excessive damages, courts and commentators have suggested other methods to
limit liability for open market violations. These include: increasing the stringency of the standard of proof as the size of the
plaintiff class and resulting potential damages increase;48legislatively abolishing private actions for open market violations and
granting exclusive enforcement authority to the SEC, with damages awards financing enforcement endeavors;'. and recognizing
existing SEC disgorgement remedies as the exclusive mode of
redress.so

C. Causation and Damages Measures
Other approaches center on limiting the scope of compensable harm. For example, one commentator advocates reintroducing the requirement of establishing proximate cause and reliance
in class actions, which would cause questions affecting individual
47. For a general discussion of the various measures possible for a rule lob-5 violation, see Jacobs, note 2 supra; Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule lob-5 Cases
Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN.L. REV.371 (1974).
48. Mullaney, Theories of Measuring Damages in Security Cases and the Effects of
Damages on Liability, 46 FORDHAM
L. REV.277, 292 (1977).
49. Note, Damages to Uninformed Traders for Insider Trading on Impersonal
L. REV.299, 317-18 (1974).
Exchanges, 74 COLUM.
50. See Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 321-22 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1053 (1977).
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members to predominate over questions common to the class,
thus defeating the class action under the Federal Rules of Civil
Pro~edure.~
The
~ Sixth Circuit's reliance on causation in
Fridrich u. BradfordB2has reduced the plaintiff class to an extent which makes a class action nearly impossible. In Fridrich
the court held that the defendants' act of trading on the basis of
inside information was not "causally connected" with any loss
by the plaintiffs, who traded on an impersonal market and
whose decision to buy or sell was unaffected by the wrongful act
of defendants. This view of causation is at odds with the Second
Circuit's view in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch." The Sixth Circuit
disagreed with the Second Circuit's interpretation of the "causation in fact" language of Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
StatesYMwhich reads as follows:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a
failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld
be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have
considered them important in the making of this decision. . . .
This obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material
fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact.55

The Second Circuit in Shapiro expanded the application of this
language from the face-to-face transaction in Affiliated Ute Citizens to open-market nondisclosure violations as well. The Sixth
Circuit, however, read the language narrowly and limited its application to the circumstances of Affiliated Ute Citizens, where
the plaintiffs' harm came as a result of a deliberate scheme by
the defendants to induce the plaintiffs to sell their stock while
the defendants withheld material facts that would have influenced the plaintiffs' decision to sell.
Elkind follows Shapiro and takes an even more relaxed
view of causation. Indeed, the Elkind court did not even separately consider whether there was causation but indicated that
materiality and scienter are the only essential elements of liability for tippee trading. It is safe to say that the Second Circuit
views causation as existing whenever the tip is material (reason51. Note, Rule lob-5 Damages: The Runaway Development of a Common Law
Remedy, 28 U . FLA. L. REV.76, 100 (1975).
52. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 US. 1053 (1977).
53. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
54. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
55. Id. at 153-54 (citations omitted).
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ably likely to affect the decision of potential buyers and sellers).
The difference of position between the two circuits results
from their different postures toward the role of causation. The
causation found to exist in Shapiro is actually nothing more
than causation of the fact of injury to the plaintiffs. Fridrich, on
the other hand, is concerned with the extent of the plaintiffs'
injury actually caused by the defendant's act. As the Sixth Circuit correctly points out, the duty of an insider or tippee to disclose is not an absolute one, but an alternative one to either
"disclose or a b ~ t a i n . "It~ is the act of trading, not the failure to
disclose, that violates rule lob-5. Because the defendant's trading on an impersonal market does not alter the plaintiffs expectations or in any way influence the plaintiffs trading decision,
the defendant's trading cannot be said to be the cause in fact of
the plaintiffs injury; the plaintiffs injury (decline in value of his
shares) would have been the same had the defendant abstained
from trading and publicly released the inside information at a
later date. It cannot accurately be said that, but for the defendant's act, the plaintiff would not have suffered a decline in the
value of his shares. The Sixth Circuit, in Fridrich, correctly determines that insider trading is not necessarily the cause of the
decline in value of the plaintiffs shares and ends its inquiry with
a finding of no causation
What Fridrich fails to recognize-and what Shapiro and
Elkind only implicitly recognize-is that the plaintiff has been
harmed in the sense that his statutory right to trade on an equal
information basiss7 has been violated and that the defendant's
illegal trading on the basis of inside information is the cause of
the plaintiffs harm in this sense. Granted, the harm suffered by
the violation of this intangible right does not necessarily equal
the decline in value of the plaintiffs shares. For this reason, the
out-of-pocket measure of damages bears no logical relation to
56. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,848 (2d Cir. 1968); 5A A. JACOBS,
supra note 3, 5 165.01; 5 id. 5 66.02[c].
57. The implied private right of action to recover for a rule lob-5 violation is
grounded in tort. The seminal decision is this area was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The rationale for judicially implying a private civil
remedy was found in the RESTA~MENT
OF TORTS
5 286 (1934), which recognized the
disregard of the command of a statute as a wrongful act and a tort. Kardon also cited
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 US. 33, 39 (1916), which recognized the right to recover
damages where the violation of a statute results in damage to one for whose protection
the statute was enacted.
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tippee trading violations in an impersonal market.s8 But the defendant has violated the rule, and the plaintiff has been harmed
by the defendant's conduct (though not necessarily to the full
extent of his monetary loss). For this reason, the Fridrich court's
denial of recovery is incorrect. In keeping with the federal
courts' broad powers to fashion remedies to effect the remedial
purpose of rule lob-5," some remedy ought to be provided. Because the extent to which the plaintiffs loss was actually caused
by the defendant is usually impossible to ascertain, the remedy
should be so fashioned that the policy objectives of deterrence
and disclosure predominate over the compensatory concerns relevant in face-to-face transactions.

D. The Damages Measure Adopted by the Elkind Court:
The Disgorgement Measure
Damages awards under the disgorgement measure are equal
to the aggregate of plaintiff losses limited by the tippee's gain.
The mechanics of this measure entail a two-part calculation.
The first part is to determine the loss of each member of the
plaintiff class.60In the case of an injured buyer this amount consists of the difference between the purchase price and the depressed market value of the buyer's shares within a reasonable
time after public disclosure." The court in the instant case indicated in dictum that it would limit recovery to interim traders
who learn of the tipped information before public disclosure:
"[The plaintiff is entitled] to recover any post-purchase decline
58. Perhaps the Elkind court was recognizing this fact when it criticized the out-ofpocket measure as inappropriate in open market violations because "it is directed toward
compensating a person for losses directly traceable to the defendant's fraud upon him.
No such fraud or inducement may be attributed to a tipper or tippee trading on an
impersonal market." 635 F.2d at 170 (emphasis added).
59. See note 39 supra.
60. The word "loss" is intentionally used to avoid the connotation of causation associated with the word "damages."
61. An injured seller (where the tippee buys on inside information) would recover
the difference between the price at which he sold and the higher fair market value of his
shares within a reasonable time after public disclosure. ALI FED.SEC.CODE$9 1708(b),
1708(a)(2)(B)(Proposed Official Draft 1978). Note: Although the 1980 bound volume of
the ALI Federal Securities Code is now in circulation, this Case Note cites to the 1978
Proposed Official Draft referred to by the Elkind court. The content of all sections cited
is the same in the two editions except for a few minor changes in wording. The 1980
Code represents the final product of the American Law Institute. For a detailed discussion of the proposed Federal Securities Code, see 33 U. MIAMIL. REV. 1425-648 (1979)
(symposium issue).
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in market value of his shares up to a reasonable time after he
learns of the tipped information or after there is public disclosure of it."62 Denying recovery for the market price decline
occuring after an interim investor learns of the tipped information but before public disclosure encourages the investor to immediately sell-in violation of rule lob-5fS A better rule would
be to eliminate the "after he learns of the tipped information"
language and allow all uninformed purchasers to recover the
post-purchase decline in value up to a reasonable time after
public disclosure, including those who learn of the tipped information prior to public disclosure-provided they do not trade
until after public disclosure."
The second part of the disgorgement measure calculation is
to determine the amount of the tippee's gain, which acts as an
upper limit of liability. This amount consists of the difference
between the price obtained by selling on the basis of inside information and the market price of the same number of shares
after public disclosure of the tipped inforrnati~n.~~
What the disgorgement measure amounts to is a potentially
full "rescissory measure"66 of damages for each individual plain62. 635 F.2d at 172 (emphasis added).
63. An injured buyer who learns of the tipped information before it is publicly disseminated becomes a tippee and hence takes on the duty to "disclose or refrain." SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,848 (2d Cir. 1968). Because he most likely will not
have the authority to make a public disclosure of the information, and because disclosure
to an individual seller is impossible on an impersonal market exchange, the buyer is
placed in the precarious position of having to choose between two undesirable alternatives: (1) He can refrain from trading and suffer the additional decline in value of his
shares until public disclosure is made, with no hope of recovering this "post individual
awareness" decline, or (2) he can immediately trade his securities-in violation of rule
lob-5--to mitigate his loss. The latter option involves the risk of incurring individual
liability for his securities law violation. In addition, it potentially eliminates, as a practical matter, his right of recovery for the decline in value of his shares up to the time he
learned of the tipped information; fear of his own violation being discovered may prevent
him from stepping forward to claim recovery for his injury. Trading to avoid the unrecoverable decline also increases the potential liability of the original tipper, who is liable
for the trading of both his direct tippee and indirect tippees. See note 13 supra.
64. This is the position taken in ALI FED.SEC.CODE5s 1703(b), 1708(b) (Proposed
Official Draft 1978). The Second Circuit may have relied on 5 1703(h)(l),which specifies
the end of "the reasonable period" (for purposes of determining the decline in value of
the injured buyer's stock) as "a reasonable period after (A) the time when all material
facts (or facts of special significance as the case may be) become generally available, or
(B), with respect to . . . a plaintiff who . . . the defendant proves knew those facts at an
earlier time, that time. . . ." If this is the case, the court overlooked the fact that 5
1708(b) explicitly states that 1703(h)(l)(B) does not apply to the damages measure.
65. 635 F.2d at 172.
66. Awarding the injured buyer the difference between the price he paid for his
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tiff, with the aggregate liability of the defendant limited to the
amount of the tippee's gain. This quasi-equitable remedy7
should be accepted as an appropriate measure of liability if it is
consistent with the policy objectives of rule lob-5.
The effectiveness of a damages formula's contribution to the
overall objective of equality of information in market trading depends largely on its deterrent effect. The court in Elkind considered the deterrent effect of the disgorgement measure in one
sentence: "To the extent that it makes the tipper and tippees
liable up to the amount gained by their misconduct, it should
deter tipping of inside information and tippee-trading.'- Although this important policy objective deserved more consideration by the court, the seemingly hasty conclusion is sound. The
potential liability of a tipper of inside information-the amount
gained not only by his direct tippee but also by all remote tippees6@-will usually far outweigh any benefit to be derived from
the wrongful tip.l0 The sufficiency of the deterrent effect on tippees is a closer question. Admittedly, the tippee stands to lose
only what he has gained from his illegal trading. However, the
deterrent effect on tippees is not nearly as important as that on
the tipper, who is the fountainhead of the stream of inside information. Usually tippees will not even be made parties to the
suit, making the measure of damages applicable to them irrelestock and the decreased market price after public disclosure would allow him to sell the
stock for the lower market price and, with his damages award, be restored to his prior
position. For the injured buyer who desires to retain his stock, the award in effect
"reduces" the original purchase price to what the market price would have been had the
undisclosed inside information been made public prior to the purchase. The rescisaory
measure of damages has sometimes been used in cases of active misrepresentation and
induced fraud. For a discussion on the rescissory measure, see Note, The Measure of
Damages in Rule lob-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN.L. REV.
371,371-77(1974).It is interesting to note that the rescissory measure involves the same
calculations and produces the same result as the out-of-pocket measure when the postdisclosure purchase price is used as nunc pro tunc evidence of "actual value" at the time
of sale.
67. Because of the lack of a definite causal link between the wrongful act and the
measure of liability, the disgorgement measure might more accurately be thought of as a
quasi-equitable remedy rather than as a measure of damages. The object of the measure
is to afford the monetary equivalent of rescission up to the amount of the wrongdoer's
gain.
68. 635 F.2d at 172.
69. See note 13 supra.
70. In most cases, the tipper derives an intangible benefit only, such as the goodwill
of the tippee. The only benefit Liggett & Myers was found to have obtained from its
wrongful tip was the maintenance of "a good relationship" with the analyst tippee. 472
F. Supp. at 134.
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vant. Moreover, the arguably weak deterrent effect of the disgorgement measure on both tippers and tippees could be heightened by prejudgment interest at a rate sufficient to make the
eventual liability exceed the benefit attained? In addition, the
deterrent effect of the disgorgement measure is augmented by
the prospects of duplicate disgorgement remedies available to
the SEC and the possibility of criminal liability."
Perhaps the major disadvantage of the disgorgement measure is that the ceiling of the tippee's gain reduces the measure's
deterrent effect on light tippee trading. Since the origination of
a private suit depends upon the likelihood of a recovery substantial enough to make the costs of litigation an acceptable risk,
minor tipping violations will likely pass unchecked by private
litigants. Although such violations are subject to SEC proceedings and criminal sanctions, the limited policing capabilities of
the SEC make the unlikelihood of deterrence from private suits
a valid concern. The Supreme Court has indicated the importance of private litigation as "a necessary supplement to Commission action" in enforcing the securities laws?' However, the
converse-holding tipper and tippee liable for full out-of-pocket
losses of interim investors regardless of the amount of shares
traded by the tippee-seems even less desirable.
Another apparent disadvantage to the disgorgement measure is that it does not fully compensate plaintiffs when their
aggregate claim exceeds the tippee's gain. However, because of
the tenuous causal link between the wrong and the injury, full
compensation may be inappropriate. Instead of granting full recovery, the disgorgement measure attempts to grant recovery
"roughly commensurate to the actual harm caused by the tippee's wrongful conduct?'
In a case where the tippee sold only a few shares, for 'instance,
the likelihood of his conduct causing any substantial injury to
71. Prejudgment interest has generally but not invariably been allowed on damages
for rule lob-5 violations. 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL,
supra note 41, § 9.22[4].
72. The SEC has express power to conduct investigations of past or potential violations of the federal securities laws. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(a)-78u(c) (1976). The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 provides for fines and imprisonment of up to five years for willful
violations of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1976). The Second Circuit has indicated by way of
dictum that SEC proceedings and private actions for damages are not mutually exclusive
remedies. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 241 11.18
(2d Cir. 1974).
73. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
74. 635 F.2d at 172.
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intervening investors buying without benefit of his confidential
information would be small. If, on the other hand, the tippee
sold large amounts of stock, realizing substantial profits, the
likelihood of injury to intervening uninformed purchasers
would be greater and the amount of potential recovery thereby
proportionately enlarged.76

The court admits that "[ulnder some market conditions such as
where the market price is depressed by wholly unrelated causes,
the tippee might be vulnerable to heavy damages, permitting
~ ~ even in
some plaintiffs to recover undeserved ~ i n d f a l l s . "But
this situation, liability is limited to the tippee's gain. Furthermore, since the measure is premised on the idea that the actual
cause of depressed market prices is difficult and sometimes impossible to ascertain, the measure takes into account the "likelihood" of the harm being caused by the tippee trading by correlating the potential liability to the volume of tippee trading. In
this manner the measure approximates the actual harm caused
and avoids "windfall recoveries of exorbitant amounts bearing
no relation to the seriousness of the miscondu~t.'~~
Because of the conflicting interests involved in the various
policy considerations that must be considered in choosing a
damages formula, it is impractical to search for the perfect
formula. Instead, courts should do as the Elkind court did and
choose the formula that on balance best achieves the policy aims
of deterring violators and compensating victims but avoiding the
imposition of exorbitant damages bearing no relation to the
wrong committed. Of all the measures suggested in the legal
literature on this subject, the disgorgement measure strikes the
best balance among these policy aims.

E. The Scope of the Elkind Decision
Even if one accepts the proposition that Elkind u. Liggett &
Myers, Inc. is sound when limited to its facts, the broad question remains of defining the reach of the court's decision. For
example, should the disgorgement measure apply to a corporate
insider who trades on his own account while withholding material inside information? Although the court did not expressly indicate that the new measure was to apply to cases of insider
75. Id.
76. Id. at 172-73.
77. Id. at 172.
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trading, such an intention may be inferred. The ALI Federal Securities Code, relied on by the court, imposes the disgorgement
measure on corporate insiders who trade on their own account.78
The consensus of opinion favors the same measure of damages
for corporate insiders as for tippers and tippees.le
Basically, the same policy considerations involved in tippeetrading cases apply to insider-trading cases. Perhaps the only
difference lies in the level of deterrence desired. It might be argued that under the disgorgement measure a tipper of inside information stands to lose much more than he gains by tipping
and that the disgorgement measure thus adequately deters the
evils of tipping at the source. In contrast, a corporate insider
who trades on his own account stands to lose only what he has
gained by his wrongful act and thus is not adequately deterred.
However, the need to deter insider trading is not as great as the
need to deter tipping of inside information. "Tipping because it
involves a more widespread imbalance of information presents
an even greater threat to the integrity of the marketplace than
simple insider trading."80 Moreover, the deterrent effect of the
disgorgement measure is augmented by other factors: In addition to SEC proceedings, criminal liability, and the prejudgement interest mentioned above, an insider may be liable for
short-swing profits under section 16(b) and may suffer unfavorable tax consequence^.^ The possible availability of state law
remedies serves as an additional deterrent to insider trading."
Another question remaining after Elkind is the rigidity with
which the disgorgement measure should apply to impersonal
market violation^.^^ Should it be applied exclusively, in all cases,
78. ALI FED.SEC.CODE$5 1603, 1703(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
79. E.g., Jacobs, supra note 2, at 1130 n.211.
80. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 327 n.12 (6th Cir. 1976) (Celebrezze, J., concurring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); cf. Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc.,
325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (tipper is more a t fault than .tippee who trades on the
tipped information). Although the prevalence of tipping is unknown, some estimate that
it is rather widespread. 2 A. BROMBERG
& L. LOWENFELS,
SECURITIES
FRAUD
& COMMODITIES FRAUD
8 7.5(1) (1979).
81. The gain experienced by the insider on his wrongful trading presumably will
have been taken in a prior year as a capital gain. Based on analogy to the tax consequences in a section 16(b) situation, the liability may have to be reported as a capital
loss. Unless the insider has "capital gains in the current or carried-forward year against
which to offset such capital [loss], the loss may be of limited value to [him]. I.R.C. 8
1211(b)." 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL,
supra note 41, 8 9.22[5] n.475.
82. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78
(1969).
83. The term "impersonal market violation" embraces trading on inside information
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or should the ceiling of the tippee's gain be removed in certain
instances to allow full rescissory or out-of-pocket damages? For
example, where the difficult burden of proof is overcome and the
damages actually caused by the defendant's violation are proved
to be more or less than the amount provided by the disgorgement measure, should the court abandon the disgorgement measure and award actual damage^?^ Should egregious violations
such as the selling of nonpublic inside information justify a more
stringent measure of damages? The court seemed to embrace
the disgorgement measure unreservedly and to reject the out-ofpocket measure and the direct market-repercussion theory generally. However, these questions may need to be answered on a
case-by-case basis by reexamining the policy objectives of rule
lob-5 and balancing two competing interests: (1) the convenience of the precise, workable formula of the disgorgement
measure, and (2) the desirability of fixing liability so that it is
commensurate with the wrong done and the damage actually
caused thereby. In most cases, the disgorgement measure will
satisfy both interests. In order to achieve some level of certainty
and uniformity in a very unsettled area of the law, courts should
adopt the disgorgement measure as the general rule in private
actions for impersonal market violations and deviate therefrom
only in rare instances.

In Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc. the Second Circuit was
faced with the difficult task of choosing a damages formula for
tippee-trading violations under rule lob-5. This Case Note has
attempted to establish that the formula adopted, the disgorgement measure, is the best alternative because it strikes the best
balance among the relevant policy considerations and seems
most compatible with the theory of causation in impersonal
market transactions. It is not suggested that the disgorgement
both by insiders on their own accounts and by tippees.
84. The ALI Federal Securities Code allows the disgorgement measure to be "reduced to the extent . . . that the defendant proves that the violation did not cause the
loss.'' ALI FED.SEC.CODE5 1708(b)(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). In the situation of
an injured buyer who sells his stock before public disclosure of the tipped information,
this section may limit recovery to the amount of decline in value up to the time of sale
(or a pro rata portion thereof where the total claims exceed the tippee's gain). The ALI
Code also allows the awarding of consequential damages and costs without regard to the
limit of the tippee's gain. ALI FED.SEC.CODE88 1708(b)(3), 1723(a), 1723(d) (Proposed
Official Draft 1978).
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measure is perfect. In the future, courts that confront situations
similar to that presented before the Elkind court may wish to
explore variations of or alternatives to the disgorgement measure. For example, if it is felt that the disgorgement measure
does not adequately deter tippers of inside information, courts
might impose exemplary damages on top of the regular damages
recoverable under the disgorgement measure. Or, courts may
wish to exercise their broad remedial powers by maintaining a
flexible approach and applying a more stringent measure of
damages for particularly serious violations. The legislatures,
state and national, may wish to explore other avenues such as
the establishment of a double- or treble-disgorgement formula.
Until these and other avenues and variations have been further
explored, the Elkind decision remains as persuasive authority in
favor of the disgorgement measure of damages.
Mark W.Hansen

